FEMINIST ADVOCACY:
THE EVOLUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA'S PROTECTION FROM ABUSE ACT
MARGARET KLAWt & MARY SCHERFP

Fostering social change does not end
with the passage of effective laws. If a
law's stated purposes are to be accomplished, legislation must be monitored by
those whose lives it affects, refined through
advocacy, and tested through litigation.
Pennsylvania's Protection From Abuse
Act began as a collaboration among grassroots women's advocates, legal services
attorneys and sensitive legislators. Through
a carefully orchestrated combination of
litigation and systems advocacy, the Act has
become an effective vehicle for social
change within the legal system. This article
will examine the evolution and implementation of the Act over the past seventeen
years. It will also identify facets of the Act
which are still developing, and suggest
directions for future advocacy on behalf of
battered women.'
I. ORIGIN OF THE PROTECTION FROM
ABUSE ACT2

In the early 1970s, legal services attorneys in Pennsylvania discovered that domestic violence was the basis for many of the
divorces in their case loads, and that no

adequate protection existed for clients who
were the victims of that violence. The criminal justice system was not responsive to battered women, and the economic hardship
which could result from arrest of the abuser
was more than many women wanted to bear.
The only civil remedy available was a
"peace bond," which could be issued by
magistrates located in police district offices
in any situation involving a disturbance of
the peace. Such bonds were not effective in
protecting battered women because they
were essentially unenforceable.
At the same time, women's advocates
were forming a grass roots battered women's
movement to give voice to the staggering
number of battered women who had begun
seeking support from women's centers and
other groups. Advocates from across the
state began talking about the problem.
By 1975, the two groups came together
to take action. New York had recently
passed a statute to provide civil remedies to
victims of domestic violence.
Peggy
McGarry, an advocate based at the Philadelphia YWCA and later to be one of the
founders of Women Against Abuse, and
Larry Mass of Community Legal Services in
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Philadelphia, reviewed New York's statute
and prepared the first draft of the Pennsylvania Protection From Abuse Act. With the
assistance of Ken Neely, on the staff of Judiciary Committee member Senator Patrick
Hill, the draft was circulated throughout the
state.
The Judiciary Committee was receptive
to the proposed bill and agreed to hold a
public hearing. Battered women's advocates
from across the state gathered to participate
in the hearing. Marjorie Fields (then a legal
services attorney and now a family court
judge in New York) testified about New
York's experience with its statute.
Pennsylvania's Judiciary Committee
viewed domestic violence as a women's
issue and saw this bill as an opportunity to
do something positive for women during the
Bicentennial year. In October of 1976, with
the passage of the Protection From Abuse
Act,3 Pennsylvania became only the second
state in the country to respond legislatively
to the needs of battered women.
The Act in its 1976 form was relatively
simple. Family or household members who
resided together could file a civil petition
and obtain a court order that would direct
the defendant to refrain from abusing the
plaintiff or minor children, evict the defendant from the residence, and award temporary custody of minor children to the plaintiff. These orders could be obtained temporarily on an ec parte basis with a hearing to
be held within ten days. Final orders could
remain in effect for as long as one year.
The triumph of their advocacy efforts
profoundly affected battered women's advocates who had participated in the drafting
and passage of the Act. They continued to
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meet and decided to expand their collaborative efforts. They recognized the necessity
of publicizing the existence of the Act to
legal services attorneys and battered
women's programs, and of monitoring application of the Act by the courts.
The advocates' individual grassroots
organizing effort quickly evolved into a nonprofit corporation, the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence (PCADV).
A legal advisory committee was formed to
oversee the implementation of the Act.
Training was provided to legal services
attorneys. Model pleadings and forms were
drafted and needs surveys were conducted.
This successful combination of legislation
and advocacy, which has become the hallmark of PCADV, was born with the realization of the potential impact of a statewide
group of battered women's advocates.
II. 1978 AMENDMENTS
The efforts of PCADV's advocates in
monitoring implementation of the Act across
the state revealed problems almost immediately. The police were not authorized to
enforce protection orders. Divorced or
separated women, who were frequently at
heightened risk, were not eligible for protection at all. Further, the Act contained no
provisions for temporary child or spousal
support.
Advocates responded by drafting
amendments, which were quickly passed in
1978." The Act as amended further defined
protection order violations as indirect criminal contempt, and authorized specific punishments in the form of imprisonment for up to
six months and/or a fine of up to $1,0002
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Police were empowered to arrest abusers for
violation of protection orders upon probable
cause, regardless of whether the violation
was committed in their presence." Recognizing the harsh financial realities which
often force battered women to remain dependent on their abusers, advocates also succeeded in amending the Act to include temporary support as a provision in final protection orders. 7
Additionally, the definition of "abuse"
was expanded to include acts by people with
"legal access" to the homes of their victims,
because the groups of victims originally
protected by the Act represented only a
small portion of those who were experiencing violence. Advocates continue to push
for amendments in this area of the law,
seeking official recognition of the widespread nature of violence against women.
Because of the perceived effectiveness of
protection orders as a tool for speedy resolution of "familial" violence, however, efforts
to broaden the Act's reach also threaten to
dilute the protection afforded battered women by reducing them to one of several classes of persons to whom the orders apply.
Recently, for example, efforts have been
made to expand the Act's protections to
individuals abused by caretakers, as well as
to allow governmental entities to file for
protection orders on behalf of third parties.
These types of cases are qualitatively different from adult battered women, as victims of
elder abuse and child abuse are often unable
to act autonomously and require special
protections which are inappropriate for adult
battered women and can be better addressed
through other statutory schemes and remedies. Amendments to the Protection From
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Abuse Act, though, helped create a more
comprehensive mechanism by which battered
women could reshape their lives.
Following the 1978 successes in amending the Protection From Abuse Act, for the
greater part of the next decade PCADV's
advocacy shifted to include priorities other
than the development of the statute itself. A
statewide network of battered women's
programs was developed, and PCADV's
efforts to secure funding for member programs caused the coalition to evolve into a
funding conduit as well as an advocacy
group. Developments in the Act continued,
however, through the persistent monitoring
of the Act's implementation, litigation of
issues which called for statutory interpretation, and local advocacy efforts. During this
time, advocates also developed companion
legislation, such as Section 2711 of the
Crimes Code, which gives the police heightened arrest powers in domestic violence
situations. 8
III. LOCAL ADVOCACY: A CASE STUDY
OF PHILADELPHIA

In Philadelphia, battered women's
advocates made great strides during the
decade of 1978 to 1988. In 1979, with the
assistance of then-District Attorney Edward
G. Rendell (now Philadelphia's mayor),
Women Against Abuse expanded its shelter
program, in operation since 1977, to include
legal advocacy. The initial project, options
counseling provided by a part-time advocate,
was housed in City Hall space provided by
the District Attorney. It has since grown
into the Women Against Abuse Legal Center, staffed by attorneys and legal advocates
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who provide legal representation, advocacy,
and options counseling for thousands of the
approximately 45,000' women battered in
Philadelphia every year.
In the early 1980's, then Philadelphia
Family Court Judge Nicholas B. Cipriani
convened a committee to develop local
procedural rules for practice under the Protection From Abuse Act. Legal services
attorneys and Women Against Abuse attorneys were among those who participated.
As part of its work, the Committee succeeded in establishing a certification procedure for emergency protection orders, mandated but never implemented by the 1976
version of the Act. Because the Act's provision had not been enforced previously,
battered women seeking emergency protection orders on evenings and weekends could
obtain only a brief respite from their
abusers--until 9:00 A.M. the next business
day--unless they filed a separate petition with
the Court of Common Pleas for a temporary
protection order. Due to filing delays,
thousands of women who took action on an
emergency basis were left at heightened risk
between the time their emergency order
expired and the point where a temporary
order could be issued. This gaping hole in
the system was corrected in Philadelphia by
the passage of local rules, which allowed for
the immediate transfer of emergency orders
issued by Municipal Court to Family Court,
for review and issuance of temporary protection orders.'"
In 1984, pressure from advocates to
meet the needs of battered women was
amplified by the tragic murder of a Criminal
Justice Coordinating Commission secretary
at the hands of her abuser. In response,
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Philadelphia's Family Court opened the first
courtroom in the country dedicated solely to
hearing domestic violence cases.
Philadelphia's Municipal Court soon followed suit with a courtroom specifically
devoted to criminal domestic violence cases.
IV. 1988 AMENDMENTS

By the mid-1980's, Community Legal
Services attorneys and PCADV advocates
statewide acquired enough experience with
the Protection From Abuse Act to embark
upon a careful process of drafting comprehensive amendments to increase the Act's
effectiveness.
A decade of monitoring
Protection From Abuse Act practice revealed
the need for increased access to the Act's
protection, as well as expansion of the relief
it offered. The amendments were crafted
over a three-year period, and were introduced as a package several times before final
passage. By 1988, however, the legislature
viewed passage of the amendments as an
opportunity to remedy injustice. Thus, H.B.
418 was passed by the House and Senate in
April of 1988, and took effect on June 20,
1988."

An analysis of the major provisions of
the amendments demonstrates how battered
women's advocates managed to successfully
use their experience with the Act to broaden
its scope in every direction. By focusing
continued attention on the problem of domestic violence, advocates exposed the
pervasiveness of battering in relationships
between intimate partners, regardless of their
marital status or sexual orientation. In many
circumstances, however, victims in less
"traditional" relationships were denied the
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protection of the Act. In response, the 1988
amendments significantly broadened the class
of people protected from domestic violence.
Gay and lesbian victims were brought within
the coverage of the Act. 2 In addition,
residency requirements were completely
eliminated, so that the Act protects people in
intimate relationships regardless of whether
they have ever lived together. 3
Recognizing that domestic violence is
manifested in many forms, advocates successfully expanded the definition of abusive
conduct to include spousal sexual assault"'
and false imprisonment' (reflecting the
hostage-taking nature of many abusive incidents). A better understanding of the complex emotional and economic ties which bind
battered women to their abusers also resulted
in an amendment requiring final protection
orders to include notice to the parties that resumption of cohabitation does not invalidate
the order, so that a battered woman will not
be deemed to have waived her right to protection just because she allowed the abuser
back into the house. 6
By the mid-1980's, rising public awareness of domestic violence and increasing
availability of support services for battered
women and their children encouraged many
women to seek court-ordered protection
from their abusers. Since filing a Protection
From Abuse Act petition for assistance required the assistance of an attorney, lengthy
waiting lists of battered women seeking
representation developed in legal services
offices across the state. As battered women
are frequently at heightened risk of further
violence when they attempt to end their
relationships, 7 the delay in access to the
courts placed many women in jeopardy.
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Advocates sought to eliminate this risk
through amendments to the Act creating a
pro se system for filing for a protection
order, and requiring courts to provide assistance in English and Spanish to pro se filers. 8
Philadelphia advocates have succeeded
in implementing the pro se filing provision
by working with the Family Court to create
the "Abuse Assistance Unit," which processes petitions for protection orders on a
same-day basis. Victims of domestic abuse
in Philadelphia are now able to file for
protection twenty-four hours a day, seven
days a week, and to obtain orders which
provide continuous protection from the time
of issuance until the petitioner appears in
court for a hearing.
The 1988 amendments also expanded
the forms of relief available under the Act.
Reflecting the difficulty faced by battered
women, who sought protection orders after
custody of minor children had been adjudicated in another forum, the amendments
explicitly permit the court to modify preexisting custody orders, under certain circumstances, when entering temporary and
permanent protection orders. 9 This provi-

sion was a source of controversy and delay
in the passage of the entire amendment package.
The amendments also provided for
confiscation by law enforcement officials of
weapons used or threatened to be used by an
alleged abuser.'
This provision enjoyed
the widespread support of police officials
and district attorneys across the state. Such
support is a manifestation of the (often
uneasy) alliance between law enforcement
officials and battered women's advocates.
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Over the last decade, domestic violence has
increasingly become a law enforcement/criminal justice issue. While the support of the law enforcement sector is important in order for abusers to be held accountable for their actions, the interests of law
enforcement and battered women's advocates
often diverge. There are numerous instances
where prosecution and incarceration may not
be the best strategy to pursue for a particular
battered woman. And while it may be easier
to gain the support of some legislators by
inviting them to view domestic violence
strictly as a criminal justice problem, this
narrow viewpoint marginalizes the issue. To
fully understand and respond to domestic
violence, legislators must be continually
reminded of the social context in which it
occurs, which includes their own neighborhoods, their own families, and sometimes
their own relationships.
The Act was also amended in 1988 to
allow for the recovery of attorneys fees and
other out-of-pocket expenses, including
medical bills and lost wages." Taken together, these provisions make it possible for
a victim of domestic violence to address all
immediate consequences of the abuse in a
single forum.
Further, the legitimacy of advocacy for
battered women was recognized in the 1988
amendments to the Protection From Abuse
Act, which defined the role of a domestic
violence counselor, not only in terms of the
training and supervision the position required, but also by delineating the activities
in which a counselor may engage'. This
amendment was initially opposed in the
legislature, apparently due to concerns about
whether a lay advocate speaking on behalf of
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a battered woman would be engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law. The Act as
amended provides for the presence of a
support person in the courtroom, but does
not specifically authorize that person to
speak on behalf of an alleged victim during
court proceedings.' 3
While the merits of institutionalizing
what essentially had been a grassroots effort
may be open to debate, the statutory invention of the "domestic violence counselor"
was accompanied by a much-needed privilege. All conversations between battered
women and their counselors, as well as the
counselor's records, are now protected from
disclosure. ' This amendment met with no
resistance, probably due to the success of
previous battles fought by the Pennsylvania
Coalition Against Rape to create a privilege
for rape counselors.
Since 1988, many other amendments
have been proposed independent of advocacy
efforts by PCADV and legal services attorneys; none have passed. As the issue of
domestic violence grows in political importance, legislators are less willing to defer to
the expertise of PCADV and legal services
in drafting amendments. Instead, they are
turning to academics and national experts
with decidedly mixed results. In recent
years, the legislature's response to domestic
violence is less and less related to empowering women, and more and more related to punishing crime. Pennsylvania legislators, the overwhelming majority of whom
are male, appear to be more comfortable distancing themselves from the issue by viewing it in this light rather than undertaking the
more complex and personally confronting
task of addressing the overall imbalance of
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power between men and women in our
society. Although law enforcement is one
important component of addressing domestic
violence, these larger societal issues are
crucial in developing a comprehensive and
effective approach. The challenge for advocates in the 1990s will be to balance the
important relationships which have been
developed with the criminal justice and
legislative systems with the grassroots efforts
to empower women out of which the battered women's movement was born.
V. LITIGATION UNDER THE PROTECTION
FROM ABUSE ACT

In contrast to the high level of legislative action, litigation, especially at the appellate level, has played a less important role in
shaping the contours of the Protection From
Abuse Act. In general, however, a review of
the body of PFA case law shows a respect
for and understanding of the statute and the
purposes which underlie it. This again is a
tribute to battered women and their advocates, who crafted a clear, enforceable law
and have continually expanded and refined
it.
Contempt proceedings under the Act are
essentially criminal in nature. The plaintiff
has a higher burden of proof, i.e. she must
prove that the defendant is in contempt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant is entitled to all criminal procedural
safeguards, such as the right to counsel, the
exclusion of inadmissible evidence, and the
right to a speedy trial.' If the defendant is
on parole, a finding of contempt constitutes
a criminal conviction which can result in his
incarceration as a parole violator.' Despite
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this, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has
upheld the legislature's determination that
defendants in PFA contempt proceedings are
not entitled to jury trials," and that defendants who have been held in contempt of
PFA orders are not protected by the double
jeopardy clause from subsequent prosecution
for the same incident.'
Trial courts as well as appellate courts
have entered a number of decisions clarifying statutory language. What constitutes
"abuse" under the Act has been perhaps the
most frequently litigated issue. Recently,
the superior court found "abuse" to include
a twisted wrist, which the defendant had
claimed failed to rise to the level of a "bodily injury" under the Crimes Code.' Similarly, a defendant's reckless behavior in a
car combined with threats to the plaintiff
were held to constitute abuse under the
Act.' Abuse was also found by a trial
court where the defendant, who had abused
the plaintiff in the past, threatened to remove
her from the home by force.3' Trial courts,
however, have not found abuse where the
defendant's proximity to his children caused
the children stress,' or where the defendant/wife threw a set of keys which accidentally hit her child in the forehead.'
Trial courts have also clarified other
provisions of the Act, particularly those
involving the payment of money by defendants. A trial judge in Warren County held
that temporary support can be awarded in
PFA proceedings even where the plaintiff
has not requested it.' In Philadelphia, a
judge recently issued an opinion establishing
that, under the 1988 amendment, which
provides for recovery of out-of-pocket losses
suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the
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abuse, the defendant must compensate the
plaintiff for the destruction of her property
even if it was given to her as a gift.' Similarly, a defendant can be ordered to pay
attorneys fees even where the plaintiff is
represented by legal services.'
Surprisingly little litigation has taken
place concerning the custody provisions of
the Act. The superior court has simply noted
that temporary custody awards under the
PFA are ancillary relief and not intended as
substitutes for established proceedings to
determine permanent custody. 7 More recently, the superior court quashed an appeal
on procedural grounds in a case where the
trial court refused to make a temporary
custody determination despite the fact that
the defendant/father had snatched four children from the plaintiff/mother. In that case,
the Women Against Abuse Legal Center in
Philadelphia, supported in an amicus curiae
brief filed by PCADV and battered women's
programs across the state, attempted to
secure from the superior court a clarification
of the scope of the trial court's jurisdiction
over custody matters in PFA proceedings.'
After monitoring litigation, PCADV has
now proposed a further amendment to the
custody section of the Act to deal specifically with situations, such as the one in
Valentine v. Wroten, where children are
forcibly or fraudulently removed from their
mothers by abusers." Another example of
legislation tracking litigation stemmed from
Heard v. Heard," a recent superior court
case which challenged the common judicial
practice of issuing "mutual orders" (i.e. PFA
orders against both parties), even where the
defendant has not filed a petition alleging
abuse. While the court did prohibit the
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issuance of such orders, PCADV has nonetheless proposed an amendment specifically
prohibiting them, in order to codify this
judicial opinion.'
VI. WHERE DO WE Go FROM HERE?:

THE FUTURE OF THE PROTECTION FROM
ABUSE ACT

The process of refining and adapting the law
is continuous. The fact that many important
amendments to the Protection From Abuse
Act have been passed and implemented over
the past sixteen years does not mean that an
end to legislative change is in sight. As the
Act was designed to deal with a dynamic
and complex social problem, it must be constantly measured against and tailored to the
changing parameters of domestic violence in
Pennsylvania. Drawing from our experience
as practitioners and as participants in the
battered women's movement, we recommend
that the following legislative areas be given
top priority.
A. Enforcement
The weakest part of the process set in motion by the Act is the enforcement of orders
once they are granted. It is now relatively
easy to obtain temporary and final orders in
most counties; it is far more difficult to
enforce their terms if violated. As a result,
the relief battered women obtain is effective
only in direct proportion to the batterer's
ignorance of the consequences of violation of
the order and belief that he could, in fact, be
sent to jail. Therefore, we suggest the addition of the following provisions to bolster
the ability of victims to obtain meaningful
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relief from the Act after the terms of their
protection orders have been violated.
1. Authorize the Pro Se Filing of
Contempt Petitions
Currently, the Act requires the court to
"provide simplified forms and clerical assistance in English and Spanish to help with the
writing and filing of the petition for a protection order for an individual not represented by counsel." ' No such assistance is
mandated for the filing of contempt petitions, which require the involvement of
counsel unless an arrest is made and the case
is picked up by the District Attorney's office. There is no rational basis of which we
are aware for determining that initial filings
are more important in protecting victims
than contempt filings for those women who
already have protection orders which are
being ignored by their abusers. In fact, our
experience tells us that this second group
may in fact be at higher risk of serious
injury or death than the group of initial
filers. The pro se assistance currently mandated for initial filings should be explicitly
extended to contempt actions.
2. Require the District Attorney's Office to
Prosecute All Contempt Actions
Mysteriously, a distinction in PFA
practice has arisen over the years between
"civil" and "criminal" contempt. This distinction, accepted by judges, prosecutors and
the private bar alike, has no basis whatsoever in the statute. The law does provide
that contempt actions can be initiated either
by the filing of a petition by the plaintiff
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(that is, by her attorney) or by prosecution
for violation of the protection order. ' Both
ways of initiating contempt proceedings
result in the same outcome: a finding of
indirect criminal contempt and the imposition of sanctions which may include up to
six months in jail." Despite this parity of
result, the courts tend to treat those cases
prosecuted by the District Attorney's office,
the "criminal" contempt, far more seriously
and are much more likely to impose real
sanctions on the defendant if he is proven
guilty. As cases prosecuted by the District
Attorney are generally those in which an
arrest was made, victims to whom the police
fail to respond are doubly penalized: they
get no immediate relief from the police and,
should they choose to pursue a contempt
action on their own, they are less likely to
get meaningful sanctions imposed by the
court.

The District Attorney should be charged
with the responsibility of prosecuting all
contempt actions, regardless of whether the
violation gave rise to an arrest. Private
filings through the court should be picked up
and handled by the District Attorney's office. Victims who wish to initiate contempt
actions through private counsel should have
the option of having the District Attorney's
office pick up the case after the petition is
filed or continuing with private representation.
3. Create Mandatory Minimum
Fines and Sentences
Currently, the Act provides for the
imposition of fines of up to $1,000 and/or
incarceration for up to six months pursuant
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to a finding of indirect criminal contempt.
These sanctions are rarely imposed. We
support PCADV's proposal to require a
minimum fine of $100, which would double
with each subsequent finding of contempt to
a ceiling of $1,000 (PCADV suggests that
these monies be used for legal advocacy and
representation of domestic violence victims)
and a minimum term of imprisonment of 48
hours where the acts of contempt resulted in
physical injury to the plaintiff or a minor
child. Where contempt is found but the
defendant is not sentenced to prison, the
judge should be required to make written
findings explaining why imprisonment was
not imposed. '

would be consistent with the decision of
Judge Edward N. Cahn of the U. S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Kauffman v. Wilson,47 which found
that holders of protection orders have a
property interest in police protection. Requiring the adoption of written policies
would permit police departments to define
the parameters of that duty to every individual officer; creating a statutory private right
of action for failure to follow the policies
would give victims a way to vindicate, in
state court, the rights Judge Cahn has already determined they have.

4. Require Police Adherence to a Written
Domestic Violence Response Policy

In addition to problems in enforcing
protection orders, several provisions of the
PFA simply do not go far enough to adequately protect women from violence. The
following amendments would go a long way
toward increasing the effectiveness of protection orders.

The Protection From Abuse Act charges
each police department in the Commonwealth with training all officers about the
provisions of the Act. There is virtually no
way to monitor or enforce this provision.
PCADV has proposed, and we agree, that
each department should be required to adopt
a written domestic violence response policy
consistent with the model protocol of the
Attorney General's Family Violence Task
Force.'
Additionally, we propose to take this
one step further and create a private right of
action for those victims harmed by police
failure to adopt and adhere to such a policy.
A victim's prima facie showing that her
injuries resulted from such a failure should
raise a presumption of police liability, thus
shifting the burden to the police department
to rebut her claim. Such an amendment
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B. Strengthen Existing Provisions

1. Extend Maximum Length of Protection
Orders From One to Two Years
The longest order currently available
under the Act is for one year. There is no
way to "renew" the order in the absence of
contempt proceedings and the issuance of a
new order, pursuant to a finding of contempt. Women's experience tells us that one
year is not a long enough time in which to
rebuild a life: new housing, new custody and
support arrangements, new schools, new
jobs, etc. If the Act is truly intended to help
victims create violence-free lives for themselves and their children, adequate time must
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be provided. The Act should be amended to
allow for automatic status listings on the
expiration date of the order for the purpose
of determining if good cause exists for an
extension. Good cause should be defined as
violations during the term of the order or
threats by the defendant to resume abuse
upon the expiration of the current order.
2. Clarify Custody Provision So
Courts May Modify Existing Custody
Orders Where Appropriate
Currently, the Act tells the court not to
change existing custody orders unless "the
defendant is likely to inflict abuse upon the
children or to remove the children from the
jurisdiction of the court prior to the hearing."'
In practice, if there is a custody
order in effect, the judge hearing the abuse
action is unlikely to modify it at all. The
statutory language needs to be changed to
requirethe court to inquire about and review
any existing custody order, and to modify it
as necessary to protect the safety of the
plaintiff and minor children during the pendency of the protection order. If no such
modification is made, the court must make
written findings explaining how the existing
order adequately provides for protection of
the plaintiff and children.
VII. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?:
OTHER AREAS OF THE LAW

The Protection From Abuse Act, useful
as it is, is merely one legal tool to help
women lead violence-free lives. Too close a
focus on the Act compartmentalizes domestic
violence and allows policy makers and
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judges to ignore the issue when it arises --as
it invariably does--in other contexts and
proceedings. The reality of battered
women's lives is too complex to be addressed and remedied in a one-day PFA hearing.
In addition to the incorporation of important
areas of family law (e.g., custody, support)
into PFA proceedings, we must work to
integrate the concerns of victims of domestic
violence into other areas of the law.
A. Custody
The 1990 amendments to state custody
are an excellent example of successful
legislative efforts to integrate concerns of
-victims of domestic violence into a different
area of the law. Judges hearing custody
cases are now required to consider evidence
of domestic violence when making any
award of custody, partial custody, or visitation. This is, in effect, a form of forced
consciousness-raising for the judiciary. They
are no longer free to decide that domestic
violence has no place in a best-interests-ofthe-child determination. Judges are now
being told, by the legislature, that one parent's violence against another negatively
affects children and must be considered and
weighed against an award to that parent.
Also, if a parent has been convicted of any
of an enumerated list of crimes, which
include kidnapping, unlawful restraint, rape,
incest and sexual abuse of children, he must
undergo a course of treatment, the treating
therapist must testify as to his progress, and
the court must find that he does not pose a
risk of harm to his child before he can be
permitted any contact with the child.'
law'
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B. Divorce
Economic dependence is one of the
major underlying reasons why women are
trapped in violent relationships. From a
policy perspective, any measure which helps
women achieve economic self-sufficiency
will enable them to leave abusive relationships or avoid becoming involved in them in
the first place. For married women, then,
the Divorce Code is a critical piece of legislation.
With the advent of "no-fault" divorce
and the 1980 amendments to the Divorce
Code, marital misconduct is no longer a
factor to be considered by the court in the
distribution of marital property. Many of the
factors which the court must consider, however, can be invoked to argue for a split of
marital assets in the wife's favor where the
husband has been abusive during the
marriage. For example, "the relative earning
capacities of the parties" might be dramatically different because the husband has
sabotaged the wife's efforts to work outside
the home and/or obtain higher education or
professional training. Similarly, "the contribution of each party as homemaker" can be
used to favor the battered wife who has
shouldered complete responsibility for child
care and household duties, as is typical in
abusive relationships. "Health of the parties"
can also be important if the wife has medical
needs, including therapy, which result from
the husband's violence toward her.'
Additionally, marital misconduct is still
explicitly relevant to alimony awards.'
Battered women and their lawyers need to
emphasize domestic violence as a form of
marital misconduct which warrants a larger
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alimony award: the rehabilitative role
alimony is now supposed to play is
especially appropriate where a wife's earning
capacity, readiness for the job market, and
overall self-esteem are low due to years of
physical abuse. Other provisions of the
Divorce Code are important for battered
women ias well, such as counsel fee awards
and exclusive possession of the home.'
C. PersonalInjury Suits
Civil lawsuits against batterers for
money damages are a little-used remedy
available to battered women. A victim of
domestic violence can use our tort system to
secure compensation for injuries such as
out-of-pocket losses and pain and suffering.
While, admittedly, intentional tort actions
are not always advisable, largely due to the
absence of insurance on the other side, they
should certainly be considered where the
batterer/defendant has assets or makes a
substantial salary.
Requiring batterers to pay money
damages to their victims is the civil
equivalent of promoting arrest and prosecution. The effect of each is to publicly
treat domestic violence as deviant/
criminal/tortious behavior which should be
dealt with in the same manner as other
conduct which harms society. Awarding
money damages to battered women also
legitimizes the severity of their injuries:
although we all know that money can never
really "make the victim whole," it is the
only measure of compensation our legal
system recognizes. Putting a high price tag
on conduct which injures women's bodies
and women's psyches communicates a clear
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message which is instantly understood by the
community at large.'
Moreover, the awarding of damages is
far more than a symbolic gesture. It can free
women from dependence on male providers
and thus help them avoid recurring abusive
relationships. And from the plaintiffs point
of view, the experience itself can be one of
great empowerment. Filing a civil suit differs fundamentally from pursuing criminal
prosecution in that the woman herself is the
plaintiff and is irr control of how the case is
litigated or settled. Lawyers who represent
battered women should routinely explore the
possibility of such suits.
D. Gender Bias Study of the Courts
Moving on to the larger picture, battered women and their advocates must find
ways to battle a problem far more insidious
than any statutory language: the attitudes of
judges, non-judicial decision-makers, and
court personnel. We may know, intuitively,
that when battered women take the witness
stand they are not believed, but we need
hard evidence of this if we are to secure any
real change. So far, a number of states have
conducted gender bias studies of their court
systems and the results have been predictably distressing. Women lawyers, litigants
and court personnel all encounter discrimination in their contact with the judicial system,
and battered women are at the bottom of the
heap.- Battered women's stories are not believed, their experience is trivialized, and the
danger they face is minimized.
The authors of this article have experienced such bias firsthand in the Philadelphia Family Court. For example, one judge
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who hears custody cases seems to believe
that evidence of domestic violence is relevant to a woman's desire to limit the batterer's contact with her children only because it gives her a reason to be angry with
him and to want to (unjustly) penalize him.
The more she expresses concern about the
safety of her children, the more her sincerity
is questioned.
The data generated by these studies-most of which are funded by the court systems themselves--are troubling, even to the
most unenlightened members of the judiciary. The studies invariably involve recommendations for remedying the documented
bias which can then be translated into funding forjudicial education programs, adoption
of non-discriminatory policies and protocols,
and court monitoring.
Pennsylvania has done no such study.
Requests to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
to fund and oversee such a study have been
flatly turned down.' Efforts to do a statewide study continue, however, even in the
absence of judicial support. Battered women
and their advocates must support these efforts as critical to the struggle to make their
voices heard and understood in courts
throughout the Commonwealth.
VIII. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?:
MOVING BEYOND THE LAW

Ultimately, even lawyers recognize that
legal solutions alone cannot eradicate domestic violence. On October 19, 1991, a symposium celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of
the Protection From Abuse Act was held at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Battered women, battered women's advo-
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cates, lawyers, law students, police officers,
and others met in workshops to discuss
various topics related to the Act and then
coalesced to share their recommendations.
This larger discussion provided a foundation
for developing an agenda for the future. It
included ideas for preventing domestic violence through educational programs in the
schools, funding for a panoply of services
for battered women, better police response,
gun control laws, and the promotion of
social policies which help women achieve
economic parity.
We must never lose sight of the fact that
our agenda is this larger picture, not simply
the refinement of the statute. The lessons in
effective advocacy that we can learn from
studying the Protection From Abuse Act's
history and evolution, though, are invaluable; they can and should be applied to
every one of these broader goals. If we in
the battered women's movement can be as
successful in tackling the challenges that lie
ahead as we have been with the Protection
From Abuse Act, the future for women may
still hold the promise of peace.
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21. See id. § 6108 (a) (8).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 1993

HYBRID: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

22. See id. § 6102.
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